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Abstract: This paper examines the economic impact of the inception of the full dollarization1 in 
Zimbabwe’s economy after the effects of hyperinflation and an unprecedented depreciation of an 
exchange rate between 2000 and 2008. Dollarization is a generic word implying the use of any foreign 
currency as legal tender instead of the domestic currency. An analytical qualitative approach was adopted 
for this study. The analysis of the benefits and costs of dollarization to Zimbabwe’s economy revealed 
how dollarization has impacted on the stabilization of Zimbabwe’s economy. This article also highlights 
the fact that Zimbabwe is not the only country in Africa that has had to resort to adopting foreign 
currency as legal tender in an effort to remedy macroeconomic imbalances. To our knowledge, there is 
scant literature on dollarization in Africa and this is the reason why we have chosen to examine the 
impact of dollarization on Zimbabwe’s economy. In addition, we add to Kurt Schuler’s work (2005) by 
indicating the other African countries that had adopted dollarization over the years. Furthermore, the 
study offers support to recent literature that asserts that economic stabilization in these countries 
resulted from the impact of dollarization. The results of the study revealed that dollarization positively 
impacts on the country’s economy. In particular, this study is important to policymakers in that it sheds 
some insight into the importance of a strong currency and stable exchange rate for the stabilization of 
economies that experienced hyperinflation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Zimbabwe has a population of approximately 13 million people (ZimStat)2, 2012) with 80 per cent living 
in the rural areas. At independence in 1980, the gross national income (GNI) per capita was US$ 1080 and 
by 2012 it had dropped to a GNI per capita of US$ 460 (UNIDO, 2011) which is less than half of the GNI 
that prevailed in 1980/81. Furthermore, for the sake of national pride, the country adopted the 
Zimbabwe dollar (ZW$) as an official currency, replacing the Rhodesian dollar at parity. The Zimbabwe 
dollar at its inception had an exchange rate that was one Zimbabwe dollar to 1.47 US$. However, by July 
2008 its value had dropped to ZW$10 billion to 0.33 US$, fuelled by the substantial increase in money 
supply of ZW$20.5 trillion (RBZ, 2006, 2008; ZimStat, 2008), and this led to an upsurge in inflation. By the 
end of 2008 most of Zimbabwe’s business community stopped accepting the Zimbabwe dollar (Biti, 2013; 
Daily Telegraph, 2008).The caveat to Zimbabwe hyperinflation that led to the adoption of dollarization 
started in the year2000. Between 2000and 2008, Zimbabwe’s economy experienced macroeconomic 
imbalances that saw a monthly inflation of 79.6 billion per cent (see, Hanke & Kwok, 2009) - a drop in 
gross domestic product of 40%, unemployment rate of over 80%,external payment arrears of US$3.07 
billion and high budget deficit of ZW$1760 quadrillion (Biti, 2013; CSO, 2005). Obviously, with a 
government that was dependent on tax revenues, a decline in output spelt severe difficulty in managing 
expenditures. Subsequently, the government turned to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe for financing of its 
expenditures. As a result, monetizing the budget deficit further exerted pressure on prices leading to 
incessant depreciation in the real and nominal exchange rate (CSO, 2008, 2012; Makuyana et al., 2011, 
Sikwila, 2011). The impact of an exchange rate pass-through effect on prices further stimulated the 
hyperinflation in the period 2000 – 2008 (Gust et al., 2010; Neiman, 2010; Gust et al., 2009). After 
experiencing episodes of hyperinflation (Hanke & Kwok, 2009) - depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar, 
shortage of foreign currency, exchange rate parallel market, failure of the banking system to provide 
domestic currency to both firms and individuals (2000 – 2008), it became apparent that authorities had 
failed to bring about economic stability in Zimbabwe (Makuyana, et al., 2011; Hanke & Kwok, 2009). In 
addition to economic imbalances, Zimbabwe experienced social and political instability in the period 
                                                          
1 Hereafter: Dollarization 
2 Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZimStat) 
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under study. The conflict between the ruling party the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), as well as other small parties created 
further instability in Zimbabwe’s economy. 
 
The political and economic crisis led to the establishment of a Global Political Agreement (GPA) on the15th 
of September 2008. The purpose of the GPA was that, political parties had to work together to resolve the 
economic imbalances and political crisis that had affected the country. A Government of National Unity 
(GNU) was finally established on the 11th of February 20093. After the formation of the GNU, there was a 
shift in monetary policy and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe adopted a multi-currency system with the 
USD being the official currency. This was an attempt to try and gain policy credibility and to lower 
inflation. The GPA included the drafting of a new constitution that was adopted through a national 
referendum on the16th of March 2013. After the acceptance of the constitution by the public, a general 
election would then be held and lead to the dissolving of the GNU and the GPA as the newly elected 
government would take up office. The GPA and dollarization ushered in social, political and economic 
stability in Zimbabwe (Mutambara, 2009). It is against this background that we examine the Zimbabwe 
exchange rate policy shift to dollarization. The study contributes to the new set of data on dollarization in 
Africa. Further, the study confirms that countries experiencing hyperinflation benefit from an anchor in 
the form of a relatively stable currency and exchange rate, which provides confidence to domestic 
markets and foreign investors, and subsequently, stimulates economic growth. Finally, the study adds to 
the dearth in literature on dollarization in Africa. 
 
The management of the exchange rate has been a problem for Zimbabwean authorities in the period 
(2000 – 2008). However, dollarization is viewed by Zimbabwean authorities as depriving the country of 
its sovereignty and they believe that it should be abandoned. The country is also deprived of its monetary 
policy interventions in the economy and monetization of the domestic deficit. The purpose of this paper is 
to highlight the issues that led to dollarization and its impact on the overall economy. The objectives are 
twofold: first, to explain the economic consequences of using foreign currency as legal tender in 
Zimbabwe. Second, to demonstrate that Zimbabwe is not the only country in Africa that has adopted 
foreign currency as legal tender. The research questions are as follows: What led to dollarization in 
Zimbabwe? What are the advantages (benefits) and disadvantages (costs) of dollarization? What are the 
other African countries that have dollarized in the past and/or still use foreign currency as their legal 
tender? The rationale of this study is that it adds to the limited literature on dollarization in Africa and 
other less developed countries. In addition, it sheds more light on the problem of hyperinflation and the 
difficulty it creates in the management of exchange rate (Noko, 2011). The study also benefits 
policymakers in countries that experience episodes of macroeconomic imbalance and need to resort to 
dollarization for a remedy. The paper is divided into five parts: Section One gives the introduction, 
problem statement, objectives, and research questions; Section Two deals with literature review; Section 
Three discusses the methodology and data; Section Four presents the discussion and Section Five gives 
the concluding remarks and recommendation. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several studies have been undertaken on dollarization in Latin America and emerging countries (Schuler, 
2005; Moreno-Villalaz, 2005; Berrios, 2006; Quispe-Agnoli & Whisler, 2006), but very little work has been 
done in African countries. Yet, many countries in Africa have used foreign currencies as legal tender as 
indicated in Table 2. Most studies on dollarization report that countries that have adopted dollarization 
have completely lost their sovereignty and the use of monetary policy, but have gained stability in 
exchange rate and prices (Minda, 2005, Schuler, 2005). A study of hyperinflation in Zimbabwe (Hanke & 
Kwok, 2009), indicates generated inflation data using purchasing power parity (PPP) and shows that 
Zimbabwe is second to Hungary’s in terms of the highest hyperinflation on record in the world. The high 
level of inflation has had adverse effects on Zimbabwe’s exchange rate (Gust, Leduc & Vigfusson, 2010). 
Hanke & Kwok (2009) concluded that dollarization tamed the hyperinflation that prevailed in 
Zimbabwe’s economy in the period 2000-2008. As previously mentioned, a country that adopts another 
country’s currency forgoes the use of monetary policy (Burdekin, 2008), and thereby seigniorage from 
printing local currency, which was the case with Zimbabwe. However, an adoption of an orthodox 
                                                          
3 The mandate for the government of national unity is defined in Article 3(1)(a) of GPA: “to give priority 
to the restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe”.(Ministry of Finance, (Biti , 2013:11), 
National budget statement. 
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currency boards allows a country to earn seigniorage revenue from the foreign currency (Burdekin, 2008, 
Hanke, 2002). Burdekin, in a study of Cook Island’s use of currency bonds, asserts that for small 
economies dollarization is a better alternative to currency boards due to the large costs involved in the 
adjustment from the currency boards to own currency (Burdekin, 2008).According to a study by Quispe-
Agnoli & Whisler (2006), the use of an official dollarization improved the banking system in Ecuador and 
El Salvador. In the case of Zimbabwe the banking system experienced bank liquidity problems (RBZ, 
2013), largely owing to poor cash inflows from exports, foreign direct investment, portfolio inflows and 
lack of credit lines (RBZ, 2013). 
 
Another study similar to that by Burdekin (2008), with respect to a comparison of currency boards and 
dollarization, was presented by Selgin (2005). Selgin (2005) asserts that a country that goes through 
exchange rate instability could adopt either currency boards, in which the country maintained its 
currency, but exchanged it at a fixed exchange rate. Thus, it pegged its currency to a stronger foreign 
currency or adopted full dollarization, which was the case with Zimbabwe (RBZ, 2009). Selgin concluded 
that both dollarization and currency boards had the disadvantage of a transfer of wealth to the country 
whose currency was being used (Selgin, 2005). However, currency boards could also lead to the problem 
of devaluation of the domestic currency, while dollarization had an advantage of credibility. Furthermore, 
a country would earn seigniorage under currency boards, which is not the case with dollarization. Minda 
(2005) examined countries that adopted official dollarization, such as Panama (1904), Ecuador (2001), 
East Timor (2000) and El Salvador (2001) and concluded that the adoption of full dollarization was far 
from being a remedy for all economic crises. Minda (2005) asserts that the benefits from full dollarization 
were unclear as opposed to the forfeiture of monetary sovereignty and national pride (Minda, 2005: 313). 
Minda recommended a policy directed at economic regional financial integration supported by 
appropriate economic policies. Panama has dollarized for over 100 years and the use of US$ created 
economic stability and confidence to would be investors (Moreno-Villalaz (2005). For small developing 
countries like Zimbabwe, dollarization was an ideal option that stabilized the economy, and integrated its 
financial system with that of the rest of the world (Moreno-Villaz, 2005). The dollarization also prevented 
the hyperactive printing of money supply that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe had embarked on in the 
period that preceded dollarization (RBZ, 2006-2008; Raath, 2007; Linzmayer, 2012). Ecuador 
experienced problems of high inflation, increasing domestic and foreign debt and monetary imbalance in 
the period between 1998 and 2000 that led to the devaluation of the country’s currency the Sucre, and 
thereby exerted instability on the exchange rate (Berrios, 2006). Therefore, the country resorted to full 
dollarization in an effort to stabilize its economy.4 Like many other countries that have dollarized, this 
implies that the monetary authorities in Ecuador surrendered its money supply determination (Borrios, 
2006). These developments in Ecuador support the assertion by Minda (2005) and Schuler (2005), that 
countries that dollarized passed through economic and social instability which was the case in Ecuador 
(Berrios, 2006).  
 
Another monetary policy option besides dollarization used by the countries that faced macroeconomic 
imbalances and exchange rate instability was the currency boards (Hanke, 2002). Countries that took the 
currency boards route (for example, Estonia 1992, Bulgaria 1997, Bosnia & Herzegovina 1997, Lithuania 
1994 and Argentina 1991 to stabilize their economies have not followed the orthodox currency boards 
principles, but implemented surrogate currency boards (Hanke, 2002), which in consequence, made it 
difficult to ascertain the impact of the orthodox currency boards policy. It was not clear why Zimbabwe’s 
monetary authorities chose to adopt the multicurrency system anchored on the US$ rather than the 
orthodox currency boards. A study by Melvin (1988) asserts that unofficial dollarization is a market 
monetary reform. The public and business community that lose confidence in the domestic currency 
substitute it for the relatively stable foreign currency, as store of value. Recent studies attribute 
dollarization to economic, political and social instability, among other things (Noko, 2011). However, 
Melvin (1988) argues that the root cause of dollarization is the relatively high growth in money supply. 
For example, Argentina’s monetary reform on June 1, 1983, had been preceded by a substantial growth in 
money supply of 85% per annum between 1979 and 1983. In addition, Chile’s monetary reform on 
September 29, 1975, was a result of the high money supply growth of 125% between 1971 and 1975 
(Melvin, 1988). In both countries, the reforms were demand-side monetary reforms, as opposed to the 
normal supply-side reforms, where government prints new money. Alesina & Barro (2001) examined the 
determinants of dollarization, and concluded that the growth in trade of goods and services, financial 
integration in regional blocks and globalization were strong factors that led countries to use foreign 
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currencies as legal tender. They also supported studies by Berrios (2006); Hanke & Kwok (2009); Schuler 
(2005) and Minda (2005), that the need for price stability has persuaded, for example, Argentina, Estonia, 
Bulgaria, Hong Kong and Lithuania to adopt currency boards (Alesina & Barro, 2001). One of the costs of 
dollarization reported in recent studies was the loss of national pride (Hanke & Kwok, 2009; Noko, 2011). 
Alesina & Barro (2001) argued that surprisingly, some countries that adopted foreign currency as legal 
tender also have readily accepted the use of foreign language(s), yet, the client countries view 
dollarization as a loss in pride (Alesina & Barro, 2001). 
 
Types of exchange rates and Zimbabwe’s exchange rate management: Studies on exchange rate 
clearly explain the difference between fixed and pegged exchange rates. The fixed exchange rate was said 
to be firmly related to monetary base. An increase in foreign currency automatically increases the 
monetary base, while a decrease led to a decline in the monetary base. On the other hand, the pegged 
exchange rate was weakly linked to the monetary base. An increase in foreign exchange under pegged 
rate led to an increase/decrease or unchanged monetary base, depending on the monetary authorities’ 
discretionary policy (Schuler, 2005). However, the bipolar exchange rate as presented by the fixed 
exchange rate and fully flexible exchange rate in the extreme of the spectrum involved no sterilization 
(Schuler, 2005). Sterilization implies that in the event of inbound foreign reserves build-up that could 
lead to an appreciation of domestic currency, the central bank neutralizes the changes in high powered 
money using open market operations, whereby domestic bonds are sold to maintain the monetary base at 
required levels in the economy (Schuler, 2005). In the fixed exchange rate, the monetary base adjusts 
whenever there is an increase/decrease in foreign reserves, while in the full flexible exchange rate; the 
exchange rate adjusts to affect the monetary base and the purchasing power. The Zimbabwe government 
employed and managed exchange rate with exchange controls in the period 2000-2008. The monetary 
authorities intervened actively in the market whenever disturbances occurred in the economy (Makuyana 
et al., 2011). Notwithstanding the active intervention, the authorities were unable to stabilize the 
exchange rate; the Zimbabwe dollar was substantially run down against all trade partners’ currencies, 
leading to dollarization (Hanke & Kwok, 2009; Makuyana et al., 2011; Zimstat, 2009, 2012). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The method used in this paper is an analytical qualitative approach. We compared economic outcomes 
before and after dollarization; it is abandonment of the Zimbabwe dollar as legal tender in favour of the 
foreign currency. We use the annual data for the period between 2008 and 2012, however, we note that 
no meaningful data was reported by Zimbabwean authorities during the crisis, particularly in the period 
2005 to 2007 (Hanke & Kwok (2009), but after dollarization (2009) the data was readily available. All the 
data collected is in the United States dollar. The annual data for real sectors (Agriculture, Mining and 
quarrying, Manufacturing, electricity and water, construction, finance and insurance, real estate, hotel and 
restaurants, transport and communication) covering the period 2008-2012 was obtained from the 
Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2010); ZimStats, (2013) and Ministry of Finance (2010, 2013). The real 
growth rates for all sectors were computed for the period 2008 to 2012. In addition, data extracts from 
Kurt Schuler (2005, 121-123) were used, and we have added Angola and Zimbabwe as new countries that 
have dollarized in Africa and are not shown in Schuler’s Table (2005). 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The After-Effects of Dollarization: The use of foreign currencies as an official medium of transaction 
was often embarked on during adverse episodes in economic, social and political environment (Minda, 
2005; Edwards, 1995; Agnoli & Whisler, 2006). It is not unreasonable to assert that this was the case with 
Zimbabwe 2000-2008 (Richardson, 2005). In spite of a prior economic, social and political unrest, the 
dollarization managed to stabilize Zimbabwe’s wider economy (Table 1). After the introduction of the 
United States dollar as an official currency in Zimbabwe (April 2009), the consumer price index was 
substantially brought down leading to an inflation rate that remained within single digits between 2010 
and 2012: (3.1%, 3.5%, and 3.7%5 respectively) (ZimStat, 2013). The downward movement of prices 
from monthly inflation of433.40% in May 2008-to2.5% by May 20106 clearly highlights the positive effect 
of dollarization of the Southern African country. In addition, dollarization meant that the threat of 
unprecedented devaluation and speculative attacks in Zimbabwe were minimal (Selgin, 2005: 141-144). 
                                                          
5 See, the budget of 2011 in the Herald, 26 November, 2010 
6 Central Statistics Office (2010) Zimbabwe Government, Budget 2011 
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An additional, benefit to the use of the US$ was the reduced transaction cost incurred, whenever, the 
country carried out business transaction with the United States (Mundell, 1961). 
 
Table 1 below shows annual statistics of sector growth rates before dollarization (2008) and after 
dollarization (2009-2012).As Table 1 illustrates, following the adoption of foreign currency as a medium 
of exchange, the real gross domestic product (RGDP) growth rate averaged about 8.1% per annum 
between 2009 and 2012. The year on year RGDP growth rates increased from a-14.8% in 2008 to 5.7% by 
2009. The positive growth rate in RGDP continued in the following year 2010, which saw a RGDP growth 
rate of 8.1%. In addition, a positive growth rate of 9.3% and 9.4% was reported for 
the2011/2012periods. Moreover, these results support studies that have shown that high inflation is 
harmful to economic growth (Fisher, 1993b; Bruno & Easterly, 1998; Bogetic, 2000). We note from Table 
1, that all other real sectors experienced positive average growth rates per annum in the period between 
2009 and 2012. This was an advantage to Zimbabwe’s economy, brought about by a change in the 
monetary policy. In addition, the country achieved economic, social and political stability. The consumer 
goods that were in short supply between 2000 –2008 periods were readily available following the 
introduction of the United States dollar. Turning to individual sectors, the manufacturing and mining and 
quarrying sectors contributed immensely in RGDP growth rates, among others. The manufacturing 
growth rates increased from -17.1% in 2008 to 10.2% by the end of 2009, and it recorded a positive 
figure of 6% in 2012. As can be seen from Table 1, the mining and quarrying sector growth rates 
increased from -33.4% in 2008 to8.5% by2009, and thereafter continued to record positive growth rates 
in the periods between 2010 and 2012.As previously mentioned, Zimbabwe is an agricultural based 
economy, with 80% of the population based in the rural areas as small holder farmers; and it was for 
these reasons, that the agricultural sector was important for food security.  
 
However, by 2008 the sector had declined to a low of -13.3% and this adversely affected food security 
(Table1).Despite the poor climatic conditions such as the droughts often experienced in Zimbabwe, the 
agricultural sector registered an average real growth rate of 17% per annum between 2009 and 2012.In 
the period between 2009 and 2011 the sector recorded positive growth rates of 14.9% (2009); 13.9% 
(2010) and 7.4% (2011).By the end of 2012, the sector had recorded an impressive 11.6% (Table 1). The 
other sectors, at the same time, also continued to record positive growth rates, and by 2012 the growth 
rates were as follows: electricity& water 4%; construction 1.5%; finance & insurance 23%; real estate 
1.5%; hotel & restaurants 13.7% and transport & communication 6% (Table 1). These positive growth 
rates in the real sectors could be attributed to the public acceptance of and business confidence in the use 
of the US$, and expected stable exchange rate policy compared to that of the 2000 – 2008 period. 
Although it might be argued that following full dollarization, the country lost the control of its monetary 
policy (Berrios, 2006), the stable exchange rate, lack of monetization of the budget deficit (Fisher, 1982) 
and absence of black-markets, immensely compensates for the disadvantages of dollarization (Table 1).In 
fact, Bogetic (2000) examines the use of dollarization in panama and other countries in the Western 
Hemisphere, and reports that the cost of dollarization is minimal, particularly, with worldwide regional 
integration efforts. The growing trend in regional economic blocks relatively reduces the cost of national 
sovereignty (Bogetic, 2000). 
 
Table 1: Annual Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) by Sector Growth Rates 
RGDP by Sector (%) 2008  2009  2010  2011 2012    Average* 
RGDP   -14.8  5.7  8.1  9.3 9.4  8.1 
Agriculture  -13.3  14.9  33.9  7.4 11.6  17 
Mining &Quarrying -33.4  8.5  47  25.8 15.9  24.3 
Manufacturing  -17.1  10.2  2.7  3.5 6.0  5.6 
Electricity & Water -13.6  1.9  1.5  12.4 4.9  5.2 
Construction  -8.5  2.1  1.5  1.0 1.5  1.5 
Finance & Insurance -27.9  4.5  0.5  24.0 23.0  13 
Real Estate  -36.4  2.0  0.9  1.0 1.5  1.4 
Hotels & Restaurants 2.8  6.5  0.5  10.3 13.7  7.8 
Transport & Commu’n 5.4  2.2  0.1  5.5 6.0  3.5 
Source: Central Statistics Office, National Budget Statement Ministry of Finance (2010, 2012) 
*Average growth rates between 2009 and 2012 
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, it could be argued that a relatively strong stable currency and exchange rate was 
the anchor of economic growth and stability indicated in Table1. It was widely accepted in relevant 
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literature that the disadvantages (costs) of dollarization included the giving up of the monetary policy 
and, lost seigniorage by the country resulting from using foreign currencies as legal tender (Selgin, 2005: 
144-145). The Zimbabwe government obtained substantial revenues from seigniorage before 
dollarization. However, on De jure dollarization the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe forfeited its role as lender 
of last resort, and thereby the ability to print money. The country depended on foreign countries for notes 
and coins, thereby creating constraints for the public, and firms (Selgin, 2005: 144; Hanke, 2002). The 
lack of small foreign currency denomination led to the use of coins from Botswana, South Africa, and 
United States as equivalent in order to conduct transactions by members of the public and firms, and this 
tacit arrangement further created uncertainties with respect to parity. At political level dollarization 
implied giving up sovereignty and pride which is the basis of national identity and culture in that the ZW$ 
contained momentous national symbols (Mundell, 1961). 
 
Dollarization in Africa: Table 2 below indicates 25 African countries that have dollarized in the past and 
the present. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, these include Angola, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Seychelles and Zimbabwe. As previously mentioned, in most 
cases countries that have adopted foreign exchange as an official legal tender had a background of 
economic, social and political disturbances that led to instability and poor economic growth. Some 
countries used foreign currencies due to colonization or adopted the currency from their former 
colonizers. An extract and improvement of Kurt Schuler’s table (2005: 121-123) in which countries that 
adopted dollarization in the past are shown in Table 2. Schuler’s Table indicates non-African and African 
countries that have dollarized (Schuler, 2005). In Table 2 below, we extracted African countries from Kurt 
Schuler’s Table (2005:121-123) and added new comers like Zimbabwe and Angola that are currently 
using the United States dollar. Although dollarization creates a better cushion, and contains external 
economic shocks (Moreno-Villalaz, 2005), the costs involved are likely to force governments to be 
cautious on spending and employ prudent fiscal policies. 
 
Table 2: Selected 25 African Countries That Adopted Dollarization 
Country  Year   Country  Year 
Angola   Present   Namibia 1906-1914; 1962-1993 
Botswana  1950-1976  Nigeria   1891-1913 
Cameron  1910-1916  Seychelles  1903-1919 
Egypt   1856-1898  Sierra Leone  1898-1913 
Eritrea  1900-1952; 1962-1993  Somalia   1920-1950 
Gambia   1902-1913  Swaziland  1921-1974 
Ghana   1896-1913  Tanzania  1893-1907; 1916-1920 
Kenya   1896-1898  Togo   1904-1914 
Lesotho   1921-1980  Tunisia   1973-1904 
Liberia   1880s-1985  Uganda   1906-1920 
Libya   1912-1943  Western Sahara  1930-Present 
Madagascar  1886-1926  Zimbabwe  2009-Present 
Morocco  1800s-1969   -   - 
Source: Extract from Kurt Schuler (2005: 121-123), and new countries added by researcher 
 
During the periods of high inflation such as that in Zimbabwe (2000-2008), governments benefited from 
central banks in that the budget deficit was monetized through the printing of money (Moreno-Villalaz, 
2005).Finally, although the exchange rate was not the only factor that led to hyperinflation and a decline 
in output, it certainly immensely contributed in destabilizing the economic activity in Zimbabwe. The 
challenge faced by Zimbabwe and other Sub-Saharan African countries is the need to implement 
prudential exchange rate policies in order to avoid the costs brought about by dollarization. This 
challenge provides a great area for further research on exchange rate and dollarization. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examined the impact of dollarization on Zimbabwe’s economy. The country went through an 
economic crisis in the period 2000 – 2008. The macroeconomic imbalance and decline in output 
experienced by Zimbabwe’s economy was so severe that monthly inflation soared to 79.6 billion per cent 
by the end of 2008. To deal with hyperinflation, the Zimbabwe government introduced the multicurrency 
system in February 2009 with the U.S. dollar being the official currency instead of ZW$. The benefits 
thereafter were significant; all sectors in the economy experienced an improvement with real gross 
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domestic product increasing from a negative 14.8% in 2008 to a positive 5.7% by the end of 2009. 
Stability in price level was achieved and inflation dropped to single digits. The study offers support to 
recent findings by Noko (2011), Hanke and Kwok, (2009), and Berrios, (2006) that asserts that 
dollarization leads to macroeconomic stability. Zimbabwe’s adoption of dollarization followed other 
African countries that used foreign currency as a medium of exchange. The result of the study indicates 
that a stable and predictable exchange rate policy and appropriate management of monetary policy leads 
to macroeconomic stability and economic growth. The lesson we learnt in the case of Zimbabwe’s 
economic crisis was that a stable exchange rate and currency benefits countries that experienced 
hyperinflation. For Zimbabwe to maintain a buoyant economic growth in the short to medium term, we 
recommend that the dollarization policy should not be abandoned before it achieves the objectives for 
which it was adopted. Should the country, however, opt for de-dollarization; this would open up an area 
for further research. 
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